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IN THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
Alexandria Division 
KENNETH M. ZERAN, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
v. Civil No. 96-1564-A 
AMERICA ONLINE, INC., 
Defendant. 
--------------------------) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT ON TIlE PLEADINGS 
Plaintiff Kenneth Zei"an filed this action against defendant America Online, Inc. 
("AOL") seeking to recover damages allegedly resulting from messages posted on AOL' s 
interactive computer service by an unknown third party. As this Memorandum demonstrates, 
Zeran's Complaint fails as a matter of law to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
AOL is therefore entitled to jud~ent on the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 
Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), 47 U.S.c. 
§ 230, prohibits tort actions that seek to treat an interactive computer service provider such as 
AOL as "the publisher or speaker" of content provided by othersY Because holding AOL 
11 Although two lower courts have enjoined enforcement of portions of the CDA 
pending appeal to the Supreme Court, Section 230 of the CDA is unaffected by those 
proceedings. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa.) (enjoining enforcement of Sections 
223(a) and (d) of the CDA), prob. juris. noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996); Shea v. Reno, 930 
F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (enjoining enforcement of Section 223(d) of the CDA). 
·" 
( ( 
liable for posted messages that are in no way attributable to AOL would treat AOL as "the. 
publisher or speaker" of those messages, the CDA bars Plaintiff s claims. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
AOL operates an interactive computer service over which millions of subscribers, 
who pay a fee to AOL, disseminate and receive information by means of computer modem 
connections to AOL's computer network. Much of the information transmitted over AOL's 
service originates with AOL subscribers. AOL subscribers may transmit information over 
. AOL's service through a variety of methods, including electronic mail messages (which are 
private electronic communications addressed to specific recipients) and bulletin board postings 
(which are messages generally available for review by other subscribers). 
According to the Complaint,Y on April 25, 1995, a "currently unidentified 
person" using the screen name "Ken ZZ03"~ posted on AOL's interactive computer service a 
message advertising "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts" with "grossly offensive" slogans referring 
to the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City. (Complaint ~ 5.) The posting 
indicated that anyone interested in the t-shirts should contact "Ken" and provided a phone 
Y For purposes of a Rule 12(c) motion, the allegations in the complaint are 
accepted as true and "construed favorably to the plaintiff." Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 
273 (4th Cir. 1980). By reciting Plaintiffs allegations, AOL does not concede the truth of 
those allegations beyond any facts already admitted in its Answer. 
~ A "screen name" is a unique set of characters (letters or numbers) that identifies a 
person or entity that originates a message or posting transmitted via an interactive computer 
service or the internet. AOL permits each of the subscribers to its service to have as many as 
five different screen names of no more than ten characters each. It is commonplace for an AOL 
subscriber's screen name(s) to be different from his or her real name. 
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number that allegedly belonged to Plaintiffs business. (Id. ~ 5, Ex. A.) After Zeran learned 
of the message from a reporter's phone call, Zeran allegedly informed AOL that the posting 
was a hoax and asked that it be removed. (Id. ~~ 6-7.) Zeran allegedly began receiving 
"derogatory" and threatening phone calls as a result of the posted message. (Id. ~ 8.) 
After being contacted by Zeran, AOL deleted the posted message. (rd. ~ 10.) 
Over the next three days (from April 26 until April 28, 1995), an unidentified person (or 
persons) using two slightly different screen names posted three similar messages. (Id. ~~ 10, 
15, 26.) During this period, Zeran allegedly communicated with AOL on a number of 
occasions in an effort to have the messages removed. (rd. ~~ 12-14.) Zeran claims he 
received additional calls about the messages from individuals who saw or heard about the 
po stings, including three from reporters. (Id. ~~ 9, 11-13, 18.) The reporters are not alleged 
to have done any stories on the incident, apparently because Zeran informed them that he was 
not connected with the messages. (Id. ~~ 9, 11, 18.) 
On May 1, 1995, a person using the name "Eck (Hollywood) Prater" 
purportedly sent a copy of one of the posted messages by electronic mail to Mark Shannon, a 
radio broadcaster on KRXO in Oklahoma City. (Id. ~ 19, Ex. D.) That day, KRXO allegedly 
aired a broadcast in which Shannon read out parts of the message, "incited the audience to 
call plaintiff and gave plaintiffs business phone number over the air." (rd. ~ 20.) As a result 
of the broadcast, Plaintiff allegedly "was bombarded with death threats and other forms of 
recrimination as well as violent language from Oklahoma City." (Id. ~ 21; see also id. ~ 24.) 
- 3 -
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Plaintiff does not allege that any of the messages at issue remained on AOL' s 
interactive computer service after May 1, 1995, or that any new offensive messages were 
posted after that date. (Id. ~ 26.) Plaintiff does not allege that any particular message 
remained available on AOL's service for longer than three days.1I Although Plaintiff claims 
that he continued to receive calls about the incident until May 14, 1995, he admits that some 
of those calls were apologies and even offers of assistance in the event of litigation. (Id. 
~~ 29, 34, 36-39.) 
On January 4, 1996, Zeran filed suit in federal district court in Oklahoma 
against the owner of radio station KRXO).' In that suit, he alleges that the station's broadcast 
in which Shannon read aloud portions of one of the posted messages constituted defamation, 
false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The suit 
against KRXO remains pending in Oklahoma. 
On April 23, 1996, several months after suing KRXO, Plaintiff filed this 
separate action against AOL in the same Oklahoma district court. His complaint alleges that, 
upon notice that the first posting about Oklahoma City t-shirts was a hoax, AOL had a duty to 
11 According to the Complaint, the first offensive t-shirt message was posted on 
April 25, 1995, and deleted a day later. (Complaint ~~ 5, 10.) The second and third such 
messages appear to have been posted on April 26, 1995, and April 28, 1995, respectively. ad. 
~~ 10, 15 & Exs. B, C.) The Complaint makes no allegation about how long these messages 
remained available on AOL. The Complaint alleges that the fourth (and apparently final) such 
message was posted at approximately 5:00 p.m. on April 28, 1995 (a Friday) and was still 
available on AOL's service on the afternoon of May 1, 1995 (a Monday, three days later). 'ad. 
~26 & Ex. E.) 
Zeran v. Diamond Broadcasting, Inc., No. CIV-96-0008-T (W.D. Ok.). 
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take reasonable care not only to remove the posting, but also to notify all AOL subscribers 
that the posting was fraudulent, and to employ some screening mechanism to prevent further 
postings containing his name or telephone number. (Id. ~~ 42-43.) The Complaint posits 
these duties on the basis of a single district court decision applying the law of New York (id. 
~ 43), a state whose law does not govern this suit. 
On October 16, 1996, the district court in Oklahoma entered an order granting 
AOL's motion to transfer the case to this Court.§! 
ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 230 OF THE CDA IMMUNIZES INTERACTIVE SERVICE 
PROVIDERS SUCH AS AOL FROM TORT LIABILITY FOR CONTENT 
PROVIDED BY THIRD PARTIES. 
Interactive computer services -- which enable people to communicate with one 
another with unprecedented speed and ease through the internet and related types of electronic 
networks and services -- are rapidly revolutionizing the way in which people and businesses 
share and receive information and interact with one another. One ofthe great challenges 
presented by this revolution is to develop legal rules to govern this new and dynamic medium of 
communication, including rules specifying who may be held liable for defamatory or harassing 
content disseminated over an interactive computer network. A year ago, Congress responded to 
this challenge with enactment of the CDA. 
§! While this action was pending in the Oklahoma federal court, AOL also filed a 
motion to dismiss Zeran's complaint. That motion has never been ruled on, and AOL hereby 
withdraws it in favor of this one. 
- 5 -
.' , 
.1 
~( 
One ofthe CDA's key provisions, Section 230, addressed and eliminated 
uncertainties in the law governing whether providers of interactive computer services, such as 
AOL, can be held liable for tortious coritent that other persons or entities create and cause to be 
disseminated by means of such services. Congress determined in Section 230 that providers of 
such services are immune from liability for harms caused by the dissemination of such 
information. Congress took this action because it recognized that saddling interactive computer 
services with liability in these circumstances would be inconsistent with the vigorous and vibrant 
development of this new and important means of communication. 
Plaintiff's action seeks to impose on AOL liability for allegedly tortious messages 
created and posted on AOL's interactive computer service by a third party. The action is 
therefore barred by Section 230 of the CDA and should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
A. The PlaiD Terms of Section 230 Bar Plaintiff's Suit. 
Section 230 of the CDA states that 
[n]o provider ... of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another information content provider. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). It further provides that 
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be 
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with 
this section. 
Id. § 230(d)(3). 
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These provisions operate in the present case to bar Plaintiff s action. First, as a 
threshold matter, AOL clearly is a "provider ... of an interactive computer service" within 
the meaning of Section 230(c)(1). The statute defmes an "interactive computer service" to 
include "any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables 
computer access by- multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or 
system that provides access to the Internet." Id. § 230(e)(2). AOL's electronic information 
service, which presently and at the time of the events alleged in the complaint enabled 
millions of AOL subscribers to access AOL' s computerized information service and the 
internet through modem connections to computer servers, plainly falls within this definition. 
Second, the messages about which Plaintiff complains are "information 
provided by another information content provider" within the meaning of Section 230(c)(1). 
The statute defines "information content provider" as "any person or entity that is responsible, 
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the 
Internet or any other interactive computer· service." Id. § 230(e)(3). As the complaint 
alleges, the messages at issue here were created and placed upon AOL' s interactive computer 
service not by AOL, but by an "unidentified person" using the screen names "Ken ZZ03", 
"Ken ZZ033", and "Ken Z033". (Complaint ~~ 5, 10, 15.) Accordingly, as happens with the 
hundreds of thousands of messages that AOL's subscribers post every day on AOL's service, 
AOL's role in this instance was merely that of a distributor of someone else's information. 
The unidentified person was the "information content provider" of the postings, and those 
postings were "information provided by another information content provider" -- that is, 
information from an information content provider Qther than AOL. 
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Third, Zeran's suit, which attempts to impose on AOL damages that allegedly 
were caused by messages posted on AOL' s system by another person, seeks to have this Court 
"treat[]" AOL "as the publisher or speaker" of those messages. Although the suit is couched 
as a claim that AOL was "negligent" in failing to delete andlor block the messages quickly 
enough after being notified that the initial message was a hoax, imposing liability on AOL for 
such an alleged failure to block dissemination would be no different from treating it as the 
publisher of those messages. Indeed, the duties Plaintiff seeks to impose on AOL -- to screen 
messages (i.e., edit content) and to retract those that are inaccurate -- are precisely the tasks 
that a publisher undertakes. Moreover, as demonstrated by Plaintiffs related suit against the 
radio station -- which affirmatively published 0I1e of the messages by having an announcer 
read it over the air -- the damages sought here are exactly the same as those that could be 
sought in a tort action against a publisher of defamatory content. In every respect, imposing 
liability upon AOL for these messages would treat AOL as if it had actually been the 
originator and publisher (or speaker) of the messages -- precisely the treatment of an 
"interactive computer service" provider that the statute was designed to proscribe. 
Accordingly, even if applicable state or local law would otherwise permit a 
negligence action of this sort (which AOL does not concede), Section 230 expressly prohibits 
it because it constitutes a cause of action "under [a] state or local law that is inconsistent with 
this section." 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3). 
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B. Construing Section 230 as Barring Plaintiff's Suit Is Consistent with the 
Broader Purposes of that Section. 
As both the statutory language and legislative history demonstrate, Congress 
enacted Section 230 to foster robust and vibrant discourse over computer networks, at least in 
part by removing tort liability from the distributor of third-party electronic content -- the 
interactive service provider -- and thereby eliminating incentives those providers would 
otherwise have to censor such content. At the same time, Congress recognized that 
defamation and other forms of harassment are serious problems for this rapidly emerging 
medium of communication. Congress made the key policy judgment that the best way to 
address these problems was to strengthen enforcement of existing laws against the actual 
soUrces of such unlawful content, not to impose liability on those who simply distribute the 
content. 
As the text of Section 230 states, Congress found that "interactive computer 
services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for 
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity" and that these services had 
"flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation:" Id. 
§§ 230(a)(3)-(4) (emphasis added). As a result, the explicit goal of Section 230 is ''to 
promote the continued development of . . . interactive computer services" and "to preserve the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation." Id. §§ 230(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis 
added). Congress recognized that a regulatory regime under which interactive computer 
service providers faced potential liability as publishers or speakers of content produced by 
-9-
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others inevitably would lead such providers to censor the content of speech on their networks 
to avoid the risk of liability, or even cause some providers to stop offering their services 
altogether. Such a course would impede the diversity and vibrancy of discourse in 
cyberspace. To avoid suppressing the development of interactive services in this manner, 
Congress granted these service providers immunity from tort liability for content provided by 
others. 
At the same time, recognizing the need to deter and punish truly tortious 
speech, Congress made the correlative choice to emphasize enforcement of the laws against 
the actual wrongdoer -- the person who was responsible for the tortious content. Congress 
expressly sought "to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish 
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer." Id. § 230(b)(5). 
Thus, Congress made the policy decision to deter harassment and tortious speech via 
computers not by punishing the intermediary or distributor and thereby dampening the free 
flow of communication over interactive computers services, but by putting the focus on the 
culpable developer and publisher of the unlawful content. As a result of this deliberate 
legislative choice, Plaintiffs remedies, if any, lie not with AOL, but with the person who 
wrote and posted the messages at issue and with the radio station KRXO which allegedly 
broadcast one of the messages on the air. 
The legislative history of Section 230 further confirms that Congress decided 
that state laws should not address the problem of tortious and harassing computer speech by 
making interactive computer service providers such as AOL liable for third-party content. 
- 10-
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Legislators understood that interactive service providers could not as a practical matter edit 
third-party content in the same manner as do publishers of books or newspapers: 
There is no way that any of those entities, like Prodigy, can take 
the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be 
coming in to them from all manner of sources onto their bulletin 
board. We are talking about something that is far larger than our 
daily newspaper. We are talking about something that is going 
to be thousands of pages of information every day, and to have 
that imposition imposed on them is wrong. [Section 230] will 
cure that problem . . . . 
141 Congo Rec. H8471 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (Aug. 4, 1995). In order to relieve 
interactive service providers from any duty they might have to edit third-party content, 
Congress enacted Section 230 and exempted them from tort liability for such content. 
Congress's intention to immunize interactive service providers such as AOL 
from liability for third-party content is further demonstrated by the legislation's conference 
report, which states that one of the purposes of Section 230 was to overturn the only case in 
which such a service provider had ever been found liable for content provided by others. In 
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1, *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
May 24, 1995), a district court had concluded that the interactive service provider Prodigy 
could be liable for an allegedly libelous message posted by an unidentified bulletin board 
user. The court had decided to treat Prodigy as a publisher of the message because Prodigy 
had held itself out to the public as a family-oriented service and exercised editorial control by, 
for example, screening all messages before they were posted on its bulletin boards and 
blocking those it deemed offensive. See id. at **3-4. 
- 11 -
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Section 230 overruled this decision. As the Conference Report stated: 
One of the specific purposes of [Section 230] is to overrule 
Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions 
which have treated such providers and users as publishers or 
speakers of content that is not their own because they have 
restricted access to objectionable material. 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at '194 (1996). Indeed, Congress was so intent on protecting 
interactive service providers from liability for third party content that it enacted a provision 
specifically designed to address the Prodigy situation. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) ("No 
provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of any action 
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider 
... considers to be ... harassing, or otherwise objectionable."). 
C. Plaintiff Cannot Circumvent the Bar of Section 230 By Characterizing His 
Suit as a Claim of Simple Negligence. 
If Zeran had cast his claim against AOL as a defamation claim, as he did in his 
parallel lawsuit against radio station KRXO, it obviously would fall within the proscription of 
Section 230. The basic elements of any claim for defamation include that the defendant be the 
"publisher" of the statement that is the subject ofthe lawsuit and that he have "publishe[ d]" it 
with a level of fault amounting to (at least) negligence. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
§ 558 (1977). Therefore, a fortiori, had Zeran sued AOL for defamation, his claim would have 
been barred by Section 230's prohibition of suits seeking to treat an interactive computer service 
"as the publisher ... of any information provided by another information content provider." 
- 12-
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Perhaps recognizing the futility of a straightforward defamation action in the face 
of section 230, Zeran has pleaded his claim against AOL as sounding in simple "negligence," not 
defamation. Zeran asserts that AOL should be liable on the theory that it was "negligent" in 
permitting a third-party's allegedly false messages to be disseminated over its service once it 
knew they were a hoax. However, Section 230's prohibition of lawsuits that seek to treat 
interactive computer services as publishers of third-party content would be rendered meaningless, 
if it could be avoided simply by the sleight of hand of recasting a claim for negligently 
"publishing" a third-party's false message (i.e., a defamation claim) as a claim for negligently 
failing to prevent that same message from being blocked or deleted with sufficient speed. As a 
practical matter, the claims are indistinguishable. If Section 230 were construed in a manner that 
would permit Zeran's "negligence" claim to survive, then virtually every claim that is barred by 
Section 230 could be restated in the same fashion. Congress obviously did not intend for the 
prqtections it created in Section 230 to be so easily eviscerated. 
In analogous contexts, courts have routinely rejected attempts by creative litigants 
to evade the many protections that the law affords to defamation defendants by repackaging 
defamation claims in the guise of other torts. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-
57 (1988) (plaintiff cannot circumvent First Amendment defenses to defamation action by 
pleading a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Moldea v. New York Times 
Co., 22 F.3d 310,319 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 202 (1994) (plaintiff may not "avoid 
the strictures of the burdens of proof associated with defamation by resorting" to an alternative 
tort (quoting Moldea v. New York Times Co., 15 F.3d 1137, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). "Without 
such a rule, virtually any defective defamation claim ... could be revived by pleading it as one 
- 13-
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for [another tort]." Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine. Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1408, 1420 (C.D. Cal. 
1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 1188, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812 (1989) (rejecting claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress). For the same reasons that courts have traditionally blocked 
plaintiffs from evading common law and First Amendment constraints on defamation claims 
through tricks~of pleading, Section 230 must be construed to bar Zeran's "negligence" claim. 
The conclusion that Section 230 encompasses -- and thus bars -- Plaintiff's 
"negligence" claim is underscored by the very case that he posits as the source of the "duty to 
screen" that he alleges AOL negligently failed to meet, namely Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 
776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Zeran alleges that this case, decided more than four years 
before enactment of Section 23 Q by a district court applying the common law of New York, 
created a duty for interactive computer services, "after due notice," to "screen incendiary, 
defamatory andlor bogus material" posted by third persons. (See Complaint ~ 43.) The Court in 
Cubby held that Compuserve, another interactive computer service, could not be liable in tort for 
defamatory content posted on its system by a third party absent evidence that it knew or had 
reason to know of the defamatory statements. 776 F. Supp. at 140-41. Zeran leaps from this 
holding to the novel proposition -- unrecognized by any court in any jurisdiction -- that an 
interactive computer service that receives a complaint about an allegedly defamatory message 
posted on its system has a duty not merely to remove that message, but also to intervene to 
prevent any and all persons who use its service from posting any subsequent messages that 
repeat the alleged defamation. (Complaint ~~ 42-44.) 
- 14-
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Even assuming for the sake of argument that Cubby would have supplied a basis 
for holding AOL liable in the absence of Section 230,11 a tort action based upon a duty allegedly 
deriving from Cubby plainly is barred by Section 230's prohibition of lawsuits that treat an 
interactive computer provider as the "publisher" of third-party content. The entire analysis of -
the court in Cubby revolved around whether Compuserve could lawfully be treated as the 
publisher of defamatory content posted by third parties, such that it could be held liable on 
claims of libel, business disparagement, or unfair competition. Thus, the Cubby court stated that 
the central issue with respect to the libel claim was whether or not there was a sufficient factual 
basis to subject Compuserve, as a distributor of third-party information, to the general rule that 
"one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had 
originally published it." 776 F. Supp. at 139 (citations omitted, emphasis added). §! Drawing on 
precedents protecting distributors of information such as news vendors, book stores and libraries 
11 Ev~n in the absence of Section 230, and even if this suit were governed by New 
York common law (which it is not), the Cubby decision still would not support holding AOL 
liable. Cubby at most suggests (in dicta) that an interactive computer service may be liable for a 
defamatory message posted by a third person if the service knows, or has reason to know, about 
the particular message and the fact that it is defamatory. Nothing in Cubby supports Plaintiff's 
central proposition that an interactive computer service was obligated -- even under the pre-
Section 230 law of New York -- to create and deploy screening technology that would 
automatically detect and block new messages that the service does not know about but that are 
similar to an earlier message that had generated a complaint. Likewise, nothing in Cubby 
provides any basis for arguing that an interactive computer service that deletes allegedly 
defamatory postings within a matter of hours or a few days -- as AOL did here -- can be held 
liable for damages allegedly caused during the short time that the postings were available on 
line. 
§! Similarly, the determinative issue concerning Cubby's business disparagement 
claim was whether Compuserve could be treated as having made "a knowing publication of false 
matter derogatory to plaintiff's business." Id. at 141 (citation omitted, emphasis added). 
Likewise, for the unfair competition claim, the issue was whether Compuserve had "intentionally 
uttered" an injurious falsehood. Id. at 142 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
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from tort liability for defamatory statements, and relying in part on First Amendment concerns, 
Cubby held that Compuserve could not be treated as the publisher of defamatory statements 
posted by third parties -- and therefore could not be held liable under any of the asserted tort 
theories -- if it neither knew nor had reason to know of the defamation. Id. at 140-42. 
Thus, far from supporting Plaintiff's claim against AOL, Cubby is representative 
of a more general common law rule that a mere distributor of information supplied by third 
parties may not be held liable for injury caused by dissemination of that information in the 
absence of facts establishing that it was a publisher of the information. See,~, Anderson v. 
New York Telephone Co. , 320 N.E.2d 647,647 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974) (adopting lower court 
dissenting opinion published at 345 N,Y.S.2d 740, 751 (1973» (telephone company could not 
be liable for tape-recorded defamatory messages repeatedly transmitted over its network "unless 
it is held that ... it 'published'" the messages); Tacket v. General Motors Corp., 836 F.2d 1042 
(7th Cir. 1987) (owner of property on which someone had posted defamatory sign not liable 
absent a showing that the owner "'intentionally and unreasonably fail[ed] to remove' [the] sign 
and thereby published its contents") (emphasis added); Hellar v. Bianco, 244 P.2d 757 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (where defamatory writings appeared on a men's room wall, jury must 
decide if bartender's failure to remove the graffiti for a short time after learning of its existence 
constituted a publication).21 
21 Accord Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 577(2) (1977) ("One who intentionally 
and unreasonably fails to remove defamatory material that he knows to be exhibited on [his 
property] is subject to liability for its continued publication."); id. § 581, ill. 4 (telegraph 
company without reason to know message is defamatory "is not liable for publishing a libel" 
(emphasis added»; Prosser and Keeton on the Law of TOlts, § 113, at 803 (5th ed. 1984) 
(describing libraries, news vendors, and other disseminators as "secondary publishers"). 
- 16-
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In this case, however, the express terms of Section 230 obviate any need for a 
Cubby-type inquiry into whether there is a factual basis to treat AOL as a "publisher" of the 
messages at issue. Even assuming (for the sake of argument) that application of Cubby in this 
case would support the conclusion that AOL should be liable for Plaintiff's alleged injury, such 
liability necessarily would be based on the premise that AOL was the "publisher" of the 
messages at issue. Section 230 expressly bars claims that seek to treat an interactive computer 
service as the "publisher or speaker" of third-party information and therefore immunizes AOL 
from such liability. 
In sum, no matter how Plaintiff chooses to label his suit, holding AOL liable in 
this case would place it in the same legal position as the actual speaker or publisher of these 
messages. Because section 230 prohibits such a result, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. 
n. SECTION 230 OF THE CDA REQUIRES DIS:MISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S SUIT 
EVEN THOUGH THE EVENTS AT ISSUE PRE-DATE ENACTMENT OF THE 
STATUTE. 
Although the CDA was passed after the events described in the complaint 
allegedly occurred, Section 230 of the CDA applies to this case. "A statute does not operate 
'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the 
statute's enactment or upsets expectations based in prior law." Landgyaf v. USI Film Prods., 
511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1499 (1994) (citation omitted). In fact, applying a statute to 
antecedent events "often serve [ s] entirely benign and legitimate purposes"such as giving 
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"comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers salutary." Id. at 1498. Accordingly, 
Congress may "expressly prescribe[]" that a statute should govern suits involving antecedent 
events, in which case courts must apply the statute to such suits. Id. at 1505. 
Congress provided such an express prescription in Section 230. The statute 
states that "[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any 
State or local law that is inconsistent with this section." 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3). Given that 
Zeran's suit was fIled after passage of the CDA, a straightforward interpretation of this 
provision requires that this Court determine whether Zeran has brought a cause of action 
under a state law that is inconsistent with Section 230 . .!Q1 
Indeed, the language of Section 230(d)(3) must be read to govern even suits 
pending at the time the CDA was enacted. If the section were interpreted to apply only to 
suits filed after passage of the CDA, the clause "no liability may be imposed" would be 
superfluous: the statutory prohibition against bringing any cause of action would already ban 
all future suits -- and therefore the imposition of liability -- under state laws inconsistent with 
Section 230. But a court must be "deep[ly] reluctan[t] to interpret a statutory provision so as 
to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment." Pennsylvania Dept. of Public 
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990). The clause "no liability may be imposed" 
is most naturally given operative effect by interpreting it to prohibit damages under 
inconsistent state laws in suits already pending when the statute was enacted -- suits that 
.!QI The CDA was signed into law (and became immediately effective) on February 
8, 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. Plaintiff did not commence this lawsuit until 
April 23, 1996. 
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would not be covered by the statute's prohibition on future causes of action. Clearly, if 
Section 230 applies to suits pending at the time the CDA was enacted, it must apply to all 
cases filed after the date of enactment as well, even if such cases involve events occurring 
before enactment. Thus, Section 230 applies to Zeran's suit. 
Even if this Court were to conclude (contrary to the foregoing analysis) that 
Congress did not expressly provide that Section 230 should apply to suits arising from 
conduct occurring before passage of the CDA, the statute would still apply to this case 
because it would not have a "retroactive effect." A statute has "retroactive effect" only if "it 
would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past 
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Landgraf, 114 
S. Ct. at 1505. Clearly, Section 230 does not meet either the second or third prongs of this 
test because it neither "increasers] [any] party's liability" nor "impose[s] new duties" on 
anyone. Thus, Zeran could escape applicability of Section 230 only under the fIrst prong of 
the Landgraf test, which turns on whether application of the statute would "impair" his pre-
existing "rights" in April 1995. 
In Landgraf, the Supreme Court made clear that a statute may be found 
retroactive on the basis of "impairment of rights" only if certain types of rights are shown to 
be at issue. The Court observed that "[t]he largest category of cases in which [it has] applied 
the presumption against statutory retroactivity has involved new provisions affecting 
contractual or property rights, matters in which predrctability and stability are of prime 
importance." Id. at 1500. More generally, the Court approvingly quoted Justice Story's 
- 19-
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statement that a statute acts retroactively if it "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired 
under existing laws." Id. at 1499 (emphasis added) (quoting Society for the Propagation of 
the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F.Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156)); see also id. at 
1524 (Scalia, l, concurring) (describing majority opinion as having adopted a vested rights 
criterion); Maitland v. University of Minnesota, 43 F.3d 357, 361 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994).111 
Section 230 of the CDA does not impair any vested right possessed by Zeran. 
At most, the statute removes Zeran's opportunity to rely on a rule of liability for interactive 
service providers that had been accepted by only a single trial court under the law of a state 
in which Zeran did not live. Zeran had no vested right in such a rule. Indeed, even a statute 
that has the effect of eliminating a pending tort claim does not impair a vested right. See In 
re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1996), cert: denied, No. 96-730, 1996 WL 665357 (Jan. 
13, 1997) (citing cases). A fortiori, a person has no vested right in a rule of liability it may 
invoke in some future tort action, especially when that rule has not yet been accepted either 
generally or in the jurisdiction whose law governs the action. Thus, Section 230 did not 
impair any vested right possessed by Zeran, and it therefore does not have retroactive effect. 
In the absence of such a retroactive effect, "a court should 'apply the law in 
effect at the time it renders its decision. '" Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1501 (quoting Bradley v. 
111 . To be sure, the Court noted later in its opinion in Landgraf that neither it nor 
Justice Story had restricted the presumption against retroactivity to cases involving vested 
rights. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1502 n.29. But that statement merely refers to both the 
Court's and Justice Story's conclusion that a statute could also be found to have a retroactive 
effect under two other prongs of analysis -- if the statute imposed new duties or increased a 
party's obligations with respect to past transactions. See id. at 1499, 1505. As discussed 
above, neither of those conditions applies to this case. 
- 20-
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Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)). In this case, that law includes Section 
230's grant of immunity to interactive service providers such as AOL from tort liability for 
content provided by others. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted and his complaint should be dismissed. 
- 21 -
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, AOL respectfully requests this court to grant 
judgment on the pleadings in its favor and to dismiss Plaintiff s suit with prejUdice. 
January 28, 1997 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
KENNETH M. ZERAN, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
CIV-96-1564-A 
v. 
AMERICA ONLINE, INC., 
Defendant. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
Defendant America Online, Inc. ("AOL") has filed a Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., on the 
basis that the communications Decency Act ("CDA"), 47 U.S.C § 230, 
signed into law on February 8, 1996, bars the imposition of any 
liability against AOL for events which occurred in April and May, 
1995. 
This case was originally filed in the united States District 
Court for the western District of Oklahoma on April 23, 1996, and 
on October 16, 1996, the case was transferred to this district upon 
AOL's Motion to Transfer. At the time of the transfer, a Motion to 
Dismiss was pending. AOL has now withdrawn that Motion and is 
relying solely on its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and the 
CDA as a basis for dismissal. (AOL Mem. n. 6). The pertinent parts 
of the withdrawn motion are resubmitted as Exhibits A, Band C to 
1 
the affidavit of Leo Kayser, III sworn to February 7, 1997, ("Kayser 
Aff.") because of certain inconsistencies being taken now by AOL 
compared with its withdrawn motion. 
AOL now limits its grounds for judgment on the pleadings to an 
erroneous argument that § 230 of the CDA effectively overrules that 
part of cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991), upon which plaintiff relies in asserting that AOL is subject 
to the legal standard applied to libraries, book stores, newsstands 
or other distributors of published material. 
This brief will demonstrate that AOL has literally turned the 
CDA on its head to argue an expansive safe harbor for AOL under the 
CDA and has similarly turned retroactivity/retrospectivity law 
inside out to argue that the CDA should be given retrospective 
effect. 
Because plaintiff is required by the nature of the arguments 
outlined in AOL's brief to rely upon matters outside the Complaint 
(as outlined below), this Motion should be converted into a Motion 
for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 12(c). 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The Complaint contains the following pertinent 
allegations1 : 
5. On April 25, 1995, at 14:54:35 E.D.T., unknown to 
1 Paragraphs 5, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 25, 28, and 33 were 
verified as true by plaintiff in his answers to AOL's 
Interrogatories, Interrogatory 1, attached as Exhibit 6 to the 
Affidavit of James A. Ikard. 
2 
message for someone to contact him. He also called AOL's legal 
department at (703) 918-1495 and received no response. 
14. He then called "Pamela R." again at approximately 
3:30 P.M. P.D.T., [April 28, 1995] 1-800-877-6364, Ext. 488, to 
follow up on the earlier call. She said two accounts had been 
connected from area code (617). and were associated wi th the 
situation, but neither account was related. She suggested that 
plaintiff call the police because of the seriousness of the 
situation. 
15. On April 28, 1995, at 16: 57: 52 EDT another AOL 
posting appeared under "Ken Z033" for "Naughty Oklahoma Items", 
with additional "Out of Stock" items listed and new items for sale, 
and again announcing that "I will be donating $1 from every shirt 
to the victims", and again directing callers to "Ask for Ken Due to 
high demand please call back if busy." Plaintiff's business phone 
number was again prominently featured. 
25. [After the KRXO broadcast] Also on May 1, 1995, 
plaintiff sent a letter by registered mail to Ms. Ellen Kirsh, 
counsel to AOL, which letter was also faxed at 2:26 P.M. P.D.T. He 
received no immediate response. • . 
28. At 12:10 P.M. P.D.T. [May 2, 1995J, plaintiff called 
AOL's legal department to speak to Ellen Kirsh. Plaintiff spoke 
with Jane Church who said she would discuss the matter on behalf of 
Ms. Kirsh. Ms. Church said she was not aware of the faxed letter of 
May 1, 1995, and plaintiff faxed another copy. During this 
conversation which lasted 25 minutes, all of the same information 
previously conveyed to AOL was repeated. Ms. Church again promised 
the postings would be removed relating to KENZ033 etc. 
33. At 1:28 P.M. P.D.T., [May 5, 1995J plaintiff again 
called Jane Church who arranged a twenty minute conference call 
with Peter Hippalier, Scott---, and Jean stevens. Again they said 
all material would be removed. Again plaintiff gave them all the 
information about the posting repeating its "handle". 
LIABILITY ALLEGATIONS 
Plaintiff's Complaint sets out liability allegations as well: 
42. Defendant AOL, as of 4:45 P.M. P.D.T., April 25, 
1996, upon being notified by plaintiff that the incendiary, 
defamatory and bogus posting using plaintiff's first name, -Ken-, 
and using plaintiff's telephone number was in fact a hoax, had a 
duty to plaintiff to take reasonable care to remove the posting 
promptly, to notify its subscribers that the posting was bogus by 
placing a notice on its service, including appending such an alert 
to the original posting and any subsequent postings, and to execute 
safeguards to prevent a reporting of plaintiff's name and telephone 
4 
, . 
nwnber. 2 
43. Defendant AOL, on information and belief, even 
though it was on constructi ve notice by reason of the law 
enunciated in cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. et al., 776 F.Supp. 
1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), that it was obligated after due notice to be 
able to screen incendiary, defamatory and/or bogus material posted 
on its computer bulletin board service, as of April 25, 1995, had 
failed to implement an effective screening capability upon receipt 
of due notice. 3 
44. On information and belief, the technology was 
available to defendant AOL to have had in place, as of April 25, 
1995, the capability to screen out postings based upon a name 
and/or telephone number and/or key words or phrases. 
45. Defendant AOL, therefore, failed to meet the proper 
standard of care reasonably expected of a substantial commercial 
operator of a computer bulletin board in its failure to have in 
place and readily available appropriate screening capability. 
ADDITIONAL MATTERS 
In addition to the letters attached to the Kayser affidavit, 
the following undisputed facts bear on the pending Motion: 
1. A copy of the May 1, 1995, letter from plaintiff to Ellen 
Kirsh of AOL is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Ikard Aff. 
2 As noted below, AOL did delete the posting (although long 
overdue) and canceled the bogus membership (see footnote 3, infra). 
However, the only "content" AOL was required to screen for was 
plaintiff's phone number. Had AOL been able to prescreen attempts 
to repost bombing-related items using plaintiff's phone number, 
there would have been only one posting and it would have been 
deleted within hours of the original posting. 
3 AOL has confirmed that the postings were done by a person or 
persons that obtained access to AOL as a new member utilizing a 
false name, address, phone number and credit card number. A new 
membership was opened using false information with new (deceptively 
similar) screen names as soon as the previous membership was 
terminated and then a new posting followed. (Exs. 3 and 4). Because 
AOL allows an individual to have access to AOL before it has an 
opportunity to confirm basic information, AOL is unable to identify 
the person(s) that actually posted the bombing-related items and 
the only remedy AOL provides is to terminate the bogus memberships. 
(see Exs. 3, 4 and 5 and Ex. 6, answer to Interrogatory 3, # 15.). 
5 
2. A copy of a letter from Jane M. Church of AOL to plaintiff 
dated May 17, 1995, is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Ikard Aff. 
3. An excerpt from AOL's answers to Plaintiff's First 
Interrogatories is attached as Exhibit 3 to the Ikard Aff. 
4. Documents produced by AOL in response to Plaintiff's First 
Request for Production of Documents relating to the false screen 
names used by one or more persons who made the posting in question 
are attached as Exhibit 4 to the Ikard Aff. 
5. Documents produced by AOL in response to Plaintiff's First 
Request for Production of Documents relating to the AOL's member 
policies are attached as Exhibit 5 to the Ikard Aff. 
6. An excerpt from Plaintiff's answers to AOL's First 
Interrogatories is attached as Exhibit 6 to the Ikard Aff. 
INTRODUCTION 
Reduced to its simplest terms AOL's legal argument is (1) the 
anonymous bogus AOL member was a "content provider II and the ads for 
bombing-related items on AOL's bulletin board4 was "information" 
within the meaning of the CDA, (2) the CDA provides that an 
interactive computer service cannot be liable as a publisher for 
any information provided by another content provider, (3) the CDA 
bars plaintiff's negligence claims as the functional equivalent of 
prohibited publisher liability, and (4) the CDA should be given 
retrospective effect to apply to events that occurred before its 
effective date. 
Before reaching any of the other points raised in this brief, 
4 This case involves postings sponsored on AOL's bulletin 
boards ("BBS", messages generally available for review by other 
subscribers, AOL Mem. 2), not electronic mail messages ("E-mail", 
a private electronic communication addressed to specific 
recipients, AOL Mem. 2). 
6 
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plaintiff must address one particularly troubling assertion in the 
brief. AOL is disingenuous in the extreme in its insinuation that 
"Perhaps recognizing the futility of a straightforward defamation 
action in the face of section 230, Zeran has pleaded his claim 
against AOL as sounding in simple negligence, not defamation" and 
that the court should do as other courts have "routinely rejected 
attempts by creative litigants to evade the many protections that 
the law affords to defamation defendants by repackaging defamation 
claims in the guise of other torts." (AOL Mem. 13), 
The letter from Leo Kayser, III to Jane M. Church of AOL dated 
June 26, 19955 , (Ex. D to Kayser Aff.) made it clear months before 
the CDA was adopted that the plaintiff was not seeking to hold AOL 
liable as a publisher for defamation, but rather for its negligence 
in failing to take reasonable steps to delete the bogus posting and 
keep them off AOL. (Ex. 0, p. 5). Again, in reply to Ms. Church's 
letter to Mr. Kayser of July 13, 1995, Mr. Kayser asserted that AOL 
had a duty to take appropriate action after being placed on notice 
of "phony, derogatory and obviously potentially damaging postings 
relating to a specific individual at a specific phone number." such 
as a block on elements of the posting to keep it from reappearing. 
(August 4, 1995, letter, Ex. E to Kayser Aff., page 2.) From these 
two letters it is obvious that plaintiff's counsel (al though 
hopefully "creative") have, rather than "repackaging" plaintiff's 
5 This letter contains a lengthy description of events all 
which ended up almost verbatim in the Complaint filed against 
first, Diamond Broadcasting (see Ex. B to AOL's Brief in Support of 
Its Rule 12 Motion To Dismiss Or In the Alternative, To Transfer) 
and then AOL itself. 
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claim, consistently taken the position articulated in the 
complaint, without any regard to § 230 (which did not even exist 
until months later). 
I. 
SECTION 230 OP THB CDA DOBS NOT 
ALTER THB CUBBY, INC. ANALYSIS 
The complaint makes it clear that the duty of AOL to Zeran 
arises only after AOL had received actual notice of the bogus and 
manifestly injurious posting. Cubby, Inc., supra, at 139-141. In 
Cubby, Inc. CompuServe acknowledged that as a distributor rather 
than a publisher, it would have been liable for a defamatory 
statement if it had known of such statements: 
CompuServe further contends that, as a distributor of 
Rumorville, it cannot be held liable on the libel claim 
because it neither knew nor had reason to know of the 
allegedly defamatory statements." Id. at 139. (Emphasis 
added. ) 
The Complaint does not aver that AOL is a publisher, but 
rather alleges facts which set forth a claim under the standard of 
a distributor, a standard which is met when the distributor has 
actual knowledge prior to its duty's arising. As the Cubby, Inc. 
court stated: 
The requirement that a distributor must have 
knowledge of the contents of a publication 
before liability can be imposed for 
distributing that publication is deeply rooted 
in the First Amendment, made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
at 139. (Emphasis added.) 
The case at bar does not impose upon AOL any obligation 
to examine in advance any material posted on its computer bulletin 
board; instead, the Complaint pointedly avers that AOL's duty to 
8 
plaintiff arose only after actual notice of the offensive, bogus 
posting specifically identified herein. 
contrary to the arguments proffered by AOL, the CDA expressly 
encourages AOL and other commercial operators of computer bulletin 
boards to use blocking and screening techniques. section 230(c) 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(c) Protection for Good Samaritan' Blocking and Screening of 
Offensive Material --
(1) Treatment of Publisher or Speaker --
No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided 
by another information content 
provider. 
(2) Civil Liability - No provider or user of 
an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of --
(A) any action voluntarily taken in 
good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the 
provider or user considers to be 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or 
otherwise objectionable, whether or 
not such material is 
constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or 
make available to information 
content providers or others the 
technical means to restrain access 
to material described in paragraph 
(1) • 
The CDA expressly provides under subsection (d) Effect on 
other Laws: 
(3) State Law -- Nothing in this sUbsection 
shall be construed to prevent any State from 
enforcing any state law that is consistent 
9 
with this section ... 
What section 230(c) does is, as acknowledged by AOL 
itself in its withdrawn Brief, Exhibit A, pp.17-18, Kayser Aff., p. 
3, confirm the law enunciated in Cubby, Inc. It eliminated the 
risk that a cyberspace distributor might be treated legally as a 
publisher and be exposed to strict liability as a publisher for 
false or defamatory subject matter. 6 
section 203(C) overrules stratton Oakmont, Inc. V. 
Prodigy Service Co., 1995 WL 323710 (Sup. ct. N.Y. May 24, 1995), 
as correctly pointed out by AOL (Mem. 11), where a court held that 
a cyberspace distributor, in part because it was pre-screening some 
content for distasteful words, was held to be a publisher and 
strictly liable for false information published on one of its 
bulletin boards. No prior notice to Prodigy of the alleged false 
information had been given to Prodigy by Stratton 
Oakmont or anyone else. section 230(c) (2) expressly provides a 
"safe harbor" for cyberspace distributors to edit without being 
held to such strict publishers' liability. 
6 In short, Congress clearly was concerned that the unintended 
effect of Prodigy would be to compel interactive computer services 
to do nothing about online content; instead, the CDA was adopted to 
encourage each interactive computer service to "edit content" 
without prior notice-but not be required to run the risk that by so 
doing it would become strictly liable. The very title of the 
subsection "Protection of Good Samaritan' Blocking and Screening of 
Offensive Material" (emphasis added) confirms this. Contrary to 
AOL's argument, § 230 of the CDA was adopted to protect action 
taken by a provider such as AOL, not reward AOL for its inaction 
(either by failing to take technical steps before or technical 
fixes after) once it was notified of defamatory content. It is for 
this reason that earlier in this brief plaintiff contended that AOL 
was standing the CDA on its head. 
10 
• f • , 
AOL is in error in arguing (AOL Mem. 8) that "Zeran's suit, 
which attempts to impose on AOL damages that allegedly were caused 
by messages posted on AOL's system by another person, seeks to have 
this Court "treat" AOL "as the publisher or speaker" of those 
messages. The law makes a material distinction between the strict 
liability applied to a publisher and the standard of liability 
imposed on a cyberspace distributor, which is the analogous 
standard for a public library, book store or newsstand, a standard 
that requires actual knowledge of the offending material and only 
thereafter that a reasonable effort be made to remove such material 
and prevent its being put back. Accord Cubby, Inc., supra at 140: 
Technology is rapidly transforming the 
information industry. A computerized database 
is the functional equivalent of a more 
traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent 
application of a lower standard of liability 
to an electronic news distributor such as 
CompuServe than that which is applied to a 
public library, book store, or newsstand would 
impose an undue burden on the free flow of 
information. Given the relevant First 
Amendment considerations, the appropriate 
standard of liability to be applied to 
CompuServe is whether it knew or had reason to 
know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville 
statements. 
Where the standard is whether AOL knew or had reason to know, 
(the Complaint avers actual notice), AOL is not being treated to 
legal liability as a publisher or speaker, but rather as a 
distributor. That the CDA does not alter the Cubby, Inc. analysis, 
but rather embodies it and encourages use of blocking technology is 
discussed in Note, Establishing Legal Accountability For Anonymous 
communi cation In Cyberspace, 96 Colum.L.Rev. 1526, 1550-1555 
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(1996). The distinction, which is made in Cubby, Inc., is 
consistent with the law in every jurisdiction in the United states. 
Kayser Aff. at p.4. AOL has proffered no case law in any 
jurisdiction to the contrary. 
Contrary to AOL's assertion that plaintiff's damages are 
the same as if AOL were a publisher, AOL Mem. 8, it is AOL's own 
negligent conduct in failing to take appropriate or sufficient 
remedial action after having received notice of the bogus postings 
which proximately caused the injury to plaintiff. In the same 
manner, AOL is not being held liable for the messages themselves as 
it argues, but rather for failure to take appropriate action to 
block the posting after actual notice. 
While AOL does not concede that applicable state or local 
laws would otherwise permit Zeran's negligence action, defendant 
has withdrawn its challenge to the actual negligence claim. It now 
only asserts as an affirmative defense § 230 (c), which is not 
applicable for the reasons stated above. 
AOL's generalized policy argument overlooks section 502 
amending section 223 (47 U.S.C. § 223) of the CDA: 
(e) In addition to any other defenses available by law: 
(1) No person shall be held to have violated 
subsection (a) and (b) solely for providing 
access or connection to or form a facility, 
system or network not under that person's 
control, including transmission, downloadi ng, 
intermediate storage, access software, or 
other related capabilities that are incidental 
to providing such access or connection that 
does not include the creation of the content 
of the communication. (Emphasis added.) 
In the case at bar, it is averred that AOL should have been in a 
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position after notice to control the bogus postings on its 
sponsored bulletin board. 
Treating AOL as a cyberspace distributor, with the standard of 
its conduct measured by analogy to libraries, newsstands, 
bookstores and the like, is entirely consistent with the CDA. The 
CDA does not exempt cyberspace distributors from traditional 
liability standards imposed on distributors. Robust and vibrant 
discourse over computer networks are unaffected. Operators of BBS 
such as AOL must take action only after actual and specific notice 
has been given and AOL is expressly exempted from publisher 
liability once its does implement some screening or editing 
function ("Blocking" and "Screening") to comply with the notice. 
Nor does Zeran seek government regulation. His claim sounds in 
common law negligence, which is respected in every common law 
jurisdiction in the united states. The negligence of a distributor 
is actionable in every jurisdiction. The importance of Congress' 
decision to let state law continue to impose traditional liability 
standards on cyberspace distributors is highlighted since AOL is 
unable to identify the poster of material on its BBSs when they use 
fictitious/bogus screen names. No remedy whatsoever would exist for 
persons injured by the poster of such material, if AOL, after 
notice, had no responsibility to delete and block reposting of 
defamatory, bogus material such as has occurred in the case at bar. 
Congress surely did not leave Zeran alone to chase a "culpable 
developer and publisher of the unlawful content" who cannot be 
identified by name, address or phone number and located because of 
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common law jurisdictions of the united states. See generally: 
Prosser and Keeton On Torts, Negligence § 33 Application of the 
Standard at 193-197 (5th Ed 1984). Cubby. Inc. stands for the 
legal standard applied to computer bulletin boards distributors to 
establish a duty. 
What makes the case at bar significant is that it will be the 
first time that a jury will be able to listen to all the evidence 
and decide what is the appropriate standard of care that AOL and 
other commercial BBS sponsors should meet to prevent injury after 
receiving notice that a bogus defamatory posting is occurring and 
may recur. Thus, while AOL is correct in asserting that Cubby, Inc. 
does not address the standard of care applicable to AOL's BBSs, 
plaintiff's complaint avers what that standard is, and if AOL 
disagrees, as apparently it does, this is the factual dispute that 
plaintiff intends to place before the jury, and in fact has a 
Seventh Amendment constitutional right to do so. 
In cubby. Inc. the court held there was not a sufficient 
factual basis to hold CompuServe to a standard of a distributor 
since it was undisputed that CompuServe had no knowledge, nor 
should it have known, of the defamatory nature of the posting in 
question. In the case at bar, at least for purposes of this 
motion, no factual dispute exists that for purposes of 
distributorship liability, AOL had actual notice of the bogus, 
defamatory posting as of April 25, 1~95. 
AOL totally misstates the holding of Cubby, Inc. (AOL 
Mem. 16) when it argues: 
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AOL's practices (see n. 6, supra), when Zeran gave prompt, 
appropriate notice to AOL, the distributor. 
A. AOL Is Not Sued as a Publisher 
AOL is correct when it asserts that it is not being sued 
as a publisher for defamation based upon a strict liability 
standard directed at the content. The issue for a claim against a 
distributor, is what is the appropriate standard of care to prevent 
distribution of libelous, defamatory or bogus material which is 
obviously injurious after receiving notice that the distributor is 
distributing such material? 
All of the cases cited by AOL (AOL Mem. 13-14) are claims 
made against publishers, in which the standard of liability as to 
a publisher cannot be circumvented by a proffered cause of action 
different from libel or defamation such as intentional infliction 
of emotional distress or false light averments. Zeran is not 
engaging in any such sophistry. His complaint asserts a common law 
negligence claim against AOL as a distributor, not a publisher and 
the issue is whether the distributor, once it has a duty to Zeran 
based upon notice of its distribution of bogus, defamatory 
material, exercised reasonable care to prevent further injury to 
plaintiff Zeran. 
The issue of standard of care is one generally left to a jury 
in a negligence case, once the Court determines that a duty arises. 
The question of whether duty arises is based upon the question of 
foreseeability. Once actual notice is given to a distributor, 
foreseeability is established. This is very old settled law in all 
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Thus, far from supporting Plaintiff's claim against AOL, 
cubby is representative of a more general common law rule 
that a mere distributor of information supplied by third 
parties may not be held liable for injury caused by 
dissemination of that information in the absence of 
facts establishing that it was a publisher of the 
information. 
Cubby is in fact representative of the general common law 
rule, which the Cubby court expressly states in its opinion, that 
a mere distributor of information supplied by third parties may not 
be held liable for injury caused by dissemination of that 
information in the absence of facts establishing that it, as a 
distributor, knew or should have known of the defamatory nature of 
the posting. Cubby, Inc. , supra at 140. 
The cases cited by AOL (AOL Mem. 16) in fact support 
plaintiff's legal position for holding that AOL, after learning of 
the bogus, defamatory and inflammatory posting from plaintiff 
Zeran, had a duty to remove same effectively. It is actually 
sophistry to argue, as AOL does, that a distributor held to be 
responsible for bogus and defamatory material because it had actual 
knowledge of it, and still failed to take adequate reasonable 
precautions, and thus may be deemed to have "published" it, is 
converted itself from a distributor to a publisher. The same is 
true for the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 577(2) (1977), upon 
which AOL relies. 
To subject AOL to liability for unreasonably failing to remove 
defamatory material that it knows is being widely disseminated and 
may subject it to liability for "its continued publication", does 
not make AOL a publisher. AOL's reliance upon Prosser and Keeton on 
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the Law of Torts, §113, at 803 (5th Ed. 1984) is the best support 
yet for the general common law support for the Cubby court. 
Libraries, news vendors and other disseminators are not 
"publishers". Libraries, news vendors and other disseminators such 
as BBS operators in cyberspace are potentially "secondary 
publishers", an entirely distinct category from a publisher, and 
section 230(c) (2) encourages them to be responsible and quick to 
edit and block defamatory and other objectionable matter, even at 
their own initiative and discretion, without subjecting themselves 
to the status of a publisher. Under section 230 of the CDA AOL 
remains, notwithstanding its decision to block or edit specific 
postings -- a mere distributor -- without the threat that the 
reasoning in stratton Oakmont, supra, had imposed prior to 
enactment of the CDA. If the court agrees that the section 230(C) 
does not bar plaintiff's negligence action against AOL in its 
capacity as a distributor, it need not go to the second part of 
this Memorandum of Law, which discusses the law on the issue of 
retroacti vi ty , since the CDA was enacted well after the facts 
giving rise to plaintiff's claims. 
II. 
THE CDA DOES NOT HAVB RETROSPECTIVE EPPECT ON THE EVENTS 
WHICH GIVE RISE TO AOL'S STATB TORT LIABILITY. 
The events which give rise to negligence liability for AOL 
under traditional state tort concepts occurred in April and May, 
1995. The CDA was signed into law in February, 1996. Long prior to 
adoption of the CDA, plaintiff was setting forth the operative 
facts of this case and asserting his entitlement to damages from 
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AOL under theories of liability then cognizable. (see the Complaint 
and Exs. D and E to Kayser Aff.).7 Nevertheless, AOL asserts that 
the CDA should be applied retrospectively to dismiss this Complaint 
and effectively bar all recovery by plaintiff for the injuries he 
suffered at the hands of AOL's negligence by the creation of an 
all-inclusive, safe harbor fashioned from § 230. As outlined 
earlier, AOL's reading of the applicability and scope of the CDA to 
this case is seriously flawed-in effect turning the purpose of the 
CDA on its head. Similarly, AOL's attempt to employ the CDA 
retrospectively to this case is predicated on a fundamental 
misapplication of the Supreme Court's recent decisions and the 
interpretation of those cases by the lower courts. Indeed, with the 
sole exception of jurisdictional or procedural matters, all of 
these decisions deny retrospecti ve effect to the statutes in 
question. 
The starting point on any retroactivity/retrospectivity 
analysis is whether the purported application of the statute is 
truly retroactive: 
The terms ' retroacti ve' and ' retrospective' are 
synonymous in judicial usage.... They describe acts 
which operate on transactions which have occurred or 
rights and obligations which existed before passage of 
the act. 2 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory 
Construction § 41.01, p. 337 (5th rev. ed. 1993) cited in 
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.ct. 
1483, 1498 n. 23 (1994). 
The Landgraf case is the most recent major application of 
7 As noted above in footnote 5, plaintiff sued Diamond 
Broadcasting in January, 1996, (before the effective date of the 
CDA), setting forth operative facts identical to those in the 
plaintiff's complaint against AOL. 
18 
. ' 
retroactivity to an existing statute. In Landgraf and its companion 
case, Rivers v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 114 S.ct. 1510 (1994), the 
Court considered whether two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 should be given retroactive effect to a decision on appeal. 
The initial inquiry is whether Congress has provided for such 
a retroactive effect. The court observed: 
When a case implicates a federal statute 
enacted after the events in suit, the court's 
first task is to determine whether Congress 
has expressly prescribed the statute's p~oper 
reach. If Congress has done so, of course, 
there is no need to resort to judicial default 
rules. Id. at 1505. 
In Landgraf the court meticulously reviews the legislative 
history and statutory language of the civil Rights Act and 
determines that Congressional intent to apply the new provisions 
retroactively is not justified. Id, at 1489-96. 
In its memorandum, AOL proposes that the very creation of the 
bar to liability by § 230(d) (3) of the CDA ("no cause of action may 
be brought and no liability may be imposed under any state or local 
law that is inconsistent with this section") "must be read to 
govern even suits pending at the time the CDA was enacted.", 
especially to avoid rendering the "no liability" superfluous. (AOL 
Mem. 18). These arguments were rejected by the Court in Landgraf. 
The court observed: 
A statement that a statute will become 
effective on a certain date does not even 
arguably suggest that it has any application 
to conduct that occurred at an earlier date. 
Id. at 1491. 
Thus, AOL cannot argue simply that by adopting an effective date of 
19 
the litigation/liability ban Congress intended that the CDA should 
be applied retroactively. 
Next, the court rejected the argument that retroactivity was 
required to avoid making some language in the Act superfluous. Id. 
at 1494. AOL's tautology is comparable-Congress would not have 
barred liability ("no liability may be imposed") unless it intended 
to effect events that preceded the effective date of the CDA 
because it would otherwise render the bar "superfluous". Of course, 
Congress easily could have, as it did in the civil Rights Act of 
1991, adopt the change in policy and decline to give it retroactive 
effect-meaning that the effective date does not render the bar 
"superfluous"-it merely reflects congressional will. 
The Landgraf Court noted that Congress had ample opportunity 
to make express provision for retroactive effect of the civil 
Rights Act. ("an important and easily expressed message concerning 
the Act's effect on pending cases") Id. at 1495. AOL does not argue 
that Congress has specifically provided for retroactive effect of 
§ 230 of the CDA-and Congress undoubtedly could have done so.8 
Additionally, the court declined to interpret the Act's 
creation of new remedies as requiring retroactivity even though 
many of the sections of the Act were explicitly designed to reverse 
8 e.g. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act did 
provide express retroactivity for capital cases in § 107(a) which 
"shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of 
this Act", but predicated this upon establishment by a state of a 
procedure to ensure the appointment of qualified counsel to 
represent indigent petitioners in state post-conviction 
proceedings. see Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1342 (4th Cir. 
1996) 
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a long list of Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 1489-90. Obviously, 
desiring to reverse the effect of a state court decision in 
stratton Oakmont does not equate to the expression of retroactive 
intent by Congress on the CDA. 
Finally, in the absence of express Congressional intent or 
through application of the rules of statutory interpretation 
retroactivity is not found, then other rules must be looked to: 
When, however, the statute contains no such 
express command, the court must determine 
whether the new statute would have retroactive 
effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a 
party possessed when he acted, increase a 
party's liability for past conduct, or impose 
new duties with respect to transactions 
already completed. If the statute would 
operate retroactively, our traditional 
presumption teaches that it does not govern 
absent clear congressional intent favoring 
such a result. Id. at 1505. 
These principles mandate that the CDA not be given retroactive 
effect. 
The Landgraf court starts with the general proposition that 
"the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted 
in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older 
than our Republic." Id. at 1497. 
While it is true that "[a] statute does not operate 
retrospectively merely because it is applied in a case arising from 
conduct antedating the statute's enactment or upsets 
expectations based in prior law", the court must "ask whether the 
new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed 
before its enactment." Id. at 1499. 
Whether § 230 of the CDA operates retroactively "comes at the 
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end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of 
the change in the law and the degree of connection between the 
operation of the new rule and a relevant past event." Id. 
The Court expressed the general guiding principle that 
But while the constitutional impediments to 
retroactive civil legislation are now modest, 
prospectivity remains the appropriate default 
rule. Because it accords wi th widely held 
intuitions about how statutes ordinarily 
operate, a presumption against retroactivity 
will generally coincide with legislative and 
public expectations. Requiring clear intent 
assures that Congress itself has affirmatively 
considered the potential unfairness of 
retroactive application and determined that it 
is an acceptable price to pay for the 
countervailing benefits. Such a requirement 
allocates to Congress responsibility for 
fundamental policy judgments concerning the 
proper temporal reach of statutes, and has the 
additional virtue of giving legislators a 
predictable background rule against which to 
legislate. Id. at 1501. 
Since Landgraf was decided, the courts have uniformly declined 
to give retroactive effect to federal statutes. In Maitland v. 
University o f Minnesota, 43 F.3d 357, 361-3. (4th Cir. 1994), the 
court reversed, declining to give retroactive effect to § 108 of 
the civil Rights Act of 1991 which prohibited an employee from 
challenging a litigated or consent judgment or order. The court 
noted that "Had Maitland known that the law would change and that 
he might be barred by subsequent legislation from bringing a 
lawsuit to challenge actions taken under the consent decree, it is 
probable that he would have taken a much more active role in the 
Rajender case." Id. at 363. The court found that § 108 was 
"attaching 'new legal consequences' to Maitland's limited 
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participation in the consent decree proceedings" and was therefore 
prohibited by Landgraf. Id. 
In Rafferty v. City of youngstown, 54 F.3d 278, 290 ft. 1 (6th 
Cir. 1995), the Court followed Maitland, supra, and refused to 
prohibit certain police officers from challenging conduct which was 
also covered by a consent decree. 
In Preston v. Com. of Va. ex reI. New River Community College, 
31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994), the Circuit declined to give 
retroactive effect to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as it relates to 
a private cause of action under Title IX, 20 U.S.C § 1681(a}. The 
court was faced with deciding whether Title IX should be construed 
as Title VII existed at the time the events occurred or as Title 
VII was subsequently amended. The court determined that the 1991 
amendments should not be given retroactive effect on Title IX since 
it "altered the legality of the employer's conduct and thus affixes 
new legal consequences to past conduct. Id. at 208. (emphasis 
added) . 
In Bohrman v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 926 F. Supp. 211 
(D. Me. 1996), the court declined to give retroactive effect to 
amended federal regulations9 and instead applied regulations in 
effect at the time students wer~ exposed to radioactive gas during 
a tour of a nuclear power plant, citing Landgraf. 
In a case invol ving the classic rule against retroactive 
9 Plaintiff sought to take advantage of the amended 
regulations which made the duty owed to a member of the public 
uniform regardless of whether the person is in a restricted area. 
Id. at 218; see 219 n. 6 for impact of ruling on applicable 
exposure limits. 
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impact on contracts, the court in Appalachian states Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Com'n v. O'Leary, 932 F.Supp. 646, 654 (M.D. 
Pa.1995), declined to give retroactive effect to regulations 
relating to rebates of certain surcharges for disposal of low-level 
nuclear wastes. 10 
In Travenol Laboratories. Inc. v. U.S. , 936 F.Supp. 1020, 
11024 (CIT 1996), the court declined retroactive effect to a NAFTA 
provision on the amount of interest due on excess deposits of 
estimated duties, citing Landgraf. 11 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act S 803 (d) which limited 
attorney's fees in prison cases was denied retroactive effect in 
Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 921 (7th Cir. 1996) since it would 
attach new consequences to completed conduct. 
In u.s. v. Bacon, 82 F.3d 822,824 (9th Cir. 1996), the court 
refused to apply Washington's four year extinguishment provision in 
its Fraudulent Conveyances Act retroactively since the Act imposed 
an additional element for a fraudulent transfer claim and 
impermissibly "changes the elements of a cause of action". 
In McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.2d 1236, 140-41 (6th Cir. 1995), an 
amendment which added a prohibition of the interception of cordless 
10 The Secretary of DOE imposed a three year requirement for 
a contract to qualify for a full rebate. The plaintiff's contract 
was for less than three years and DOE proposed to pay a pro rata 
amount. Id. at 651. 
11 If the NAFTA amendments were enforced to declarations made 
before the effective date, the government would be required to pay 
interest on excess tariffs when before NAFTA it did not. Id. at 
1022-23. 
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telephone communications was not given retroactive effect to a 
claim for damages for the interception of cordless phone 
conversations. 12 
Forfeiture of laundered funds under a new federal statute13 
was rebuffed in u.s. v. $814,254.76, in u.s. Currency, contents of 
valley Nat. Bank Account No., 51 F.3d 207 (9th Cir. 1995). 
Numerous courts have denied retroactivity to the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act because of the profound legal 
consequences on federal habeas proceedings from attaching new legal 
consequences to a completed event. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 
862 (7th Cir. 1996), Burns v. Parke, 95 F.3d 465, 468 (7th eire 
1996), and Boria V. Keane, 90 F.3d 36, 37-8 (2nd Cir. 1996).14 
AOL's reliance is misplaced on In Re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106 (3rd 
Cir. 1996) as supporting its assertion that "even a statute that 
has the effect of eliminating a pending tort claim does not impair 
a vested right" within the Landgraf policy analysis. (AOL Mem. 20). 
12 Under the prior act in effect at the time the events 
transpired, interception of cordless phone conversations as radio 
waves were not prohibited. Id. at 1240-41. 
13 Under the old forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. S 981, funds 
seized could be forfeited only if they were "involved in" money 
laundering "traceable" to the transactions. The amended statute, 
adopted after the seizure of the funds, permits the forfeiture of 
money even if not directly traceable to laundered funds so long as 
the account previously contained funds involved in or traceable to 
illegal activity. Id. at 208. 
14 Since Virginia had not established the required system 
before the petitioner's state post-conviction proceedings were 
instituted, S 107 of the Act was deemed not to apply; the court 
deferred a decision on the retroactive effect to the other sections 
of the Act. Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d at 1342-43, n. 3; see n. 
8, supra. 
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TMI involved the application of a statute of limitations 
retroactively to comport with express language in the statute as to 
jurisdiction and, as a result, choice of law (which applied 
Pennsylvania's limitations to Mississippi suits) for the Three Mile 
Island cases. Id. at 1115 n. 8. The court did hold that a pending 
tort claim is not a vested right for purposes of "heightened 
scrutiny" due process review. 1S It does not follow that a pending 
tort claim has no status in the Landgraf analysis which focuses on 
the fundamental fairness of retroactivity. Moreover, it is well 
settled that a new statute of limitations generally does not even 
constitute retroactive application since it does not relate to the ( 
conduct of the defendant, but rather the plaintiff's conduct in 
filing the claim. Forest v. U.S. Postal Service, 97 F.3d 137, 140 
(6th eire 1996). For example, in Forest the court retroactively 
applied the 90 day statute of limitations in the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act instead of the prior 30 day statute for a claim. Id. 
Additionally, Forest recounts that many other decisions have 
imposed the new 90 day statute for cases arising under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act involving conduct that predated 
the 1991 Act. Id. at 140-41. 
IS As noted above, the Landgraf court based its analytic 
framework on the observation that "constitutional impediments to 
retroactive civil legislation are now modest." Landgraf at 150l. 
ThUS, it should come as no surprise that depriving a plaintiff of 
the right to file suit because the statute of limitations had run 
does not violate due process. Nevertheless, this retroactive 
application of limitations (assuming it is deemed to be truly 
retroactive) might well not pass muster under the focus of the 
Landgraf test-the "potential unfairness of retroactive 
application." Id. at 1501. 
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AOL has argued that plaintiff's right to damages for its 
negligence is not the type of "right" entitled to protection from 
retroactive application of the CDA. (AOL Mem. 19-20). AOL seizes on 
the mention of the paradigm for declining retroactivity-contracts 
or "vested" rights. While Landgraf does refer to those as the well-
recognized category of contracts/vested rights, Landgraf emphasizes 
the that "[a]ny test of retroactivity will leave room for 
disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the 
enormous variety of legal changes with perfect philosophical 
clarity." Landgraf at 1499. Indeed, Landgraf emphasizes the 
linchpin of any retroactivity analysis is that "familiar 
considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled 
expectations offer sound guidance." Id. 
In Landgraf the court invoked the unfairness of imposing "an 
important new legal burden" to the conduct in question, that the 
introduction of compensatory damages that would have "an impact on 
private parties' planning", and as creating a new cause of action 
"its impact on parties' rights is especially pronounced". AOL 
appears to argue that retroactively (i.e. after all of the seminal 
events have been completed) effecting the elements of causes of 
action (or completely eliminating all available causes of action) 
is different if the party is a plaintiff than if it is a defendant-
a one way street over which only defendants may travel. The 
Landgraf court makes no such distinction and neither do its 
27 
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progeny. 16 
Moreover, Landgraf focuses on the "potential unfairness of 
retroactive application" Id. at 1501. Based upon the facts of this 
case it would be extremely unfair to dismiss plaintiff's claims 
under the retroactive imposition of § 230. These include: 
1. plaintiff took immediate action to notify AOL of the 
incendiary posting and followed it up with many communications to 
AOL -to remove the posting and avoid others from being posted 
(infra, 3-4); 
2. AOL failed to take prompt action on plaintiff's request to 
remove the posting, refused to post a retraction or notice that the 
posting was false, and failed to take steps to preclude repostings 
(supra, 4-5, ~~ 42-45); 
3. Because of the manner in which AOL solicits its new 
members, AOL was (and remains to this day) unable to identify those 
who join using bogus information; the person(s) who posted the KenZ 
postings changed his bogus information at least twice and used new 
(deceptively similar) screen names. (see Exs. 3, 4 and 5 and Ex. 6, 
answer to Interrogatory 3, # 15.). 
4. Plaintiff's counsel asserted from the earliest time that 
AOL was liable as a distributor and not a publisher, establishing 
plaintiff's reliance on the law as it undeniably existed prior to 
16 e.g. Rafferty, supra, and Maitland, supra, which declined 
to deprive plaintiffs of their claim by the retroactive effect of 
§ 108 of the civil Rights Act of 1991; U.S. v. Bacon, supra, where 
the court refused to apply a four year statute of repose 
retroactively because it "impermissibly changes the elements of a 
cause of action." Many of these cases invoke concern over 
retroactively attaching new consequences to completed conduct. 
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the adoption of the CDA (Exs. D and E to Kayser Aff.); 
5. Before the effective date of the CDA, plaintiff instituted 
an action over damages arising from the Oklahoma City radio 
broadcast which was a direct and foreseeable result of AOL's 
negligence; the basic allegations in the Complaint against Diamond 
Broadcasting, Inc. are identical to those in the Complaint against 
AOL (see supra, n. 3). 
6. All of the acts which give rise to AOL's tort liability 
occurred (were completed) long before the adoption of the CDA. 
In light of the above, especially the lack of express 
Congressional intent, application of § 230 of the CDA to the 
plaintiff's claims would the unfair, would impose new burdens on 
plaintiff's claims, change the elements of plaintiff's causes of 
action, deprive plaintiff of any remedy for AOL's negligence which 
directly and forseeably injured plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined in this brief, AOL's Motion should be 
overruled. AOL seeks to use the CDA in a manner Congress did not 
~nvision and for purposes directly contrary to the expressed 
purpose of § 230 (i.e. protecting action, not inaction, since AOL 
did not needed § 230's protection from the Prodigy case if it did 
nothing!), and seeks to abrogate well-recognized state tort 
liability for distributors. Moreover, even if the CDA does apply to 
plaintiff's type of claim. it may not be applied retroactively 
under the prevailing case law. 
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IN THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
Alexandria Division 
KENNETH M. ZERAN, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
v. Civil No. 96-1564-A 
AMERICA ONLINE, INC., 
Defendant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant America Online, Inc.' s ("AOL") 
motion for judgment on the pleadings fails to undercut the two basic points AOL established in 
its opening brief: plaintiff's suit seeks to treat AOL as the "publisher or speaker" of third-party 
information in contravention of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"), 47 
U.S.c. § 230, and Section 230 applies in this case even though the events in question pre-date its 
enactment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's suit should be dismissed. 
I. PLAINTIFF'S SUIT SEEKS TO TREAT AOL AS A PUBLISHER OF TIllRD 
PARTY CONTENT AND IS THEREFORE BARRED BY SECTION 230 OF THE 
CDA. 
In its opening brief, AOL established that Plaintiff's suit, which seeks to hold 
AOL liable for harms resulting from allegedly defamatory messages posted by an unknown 
third-party, is barred by Section 230 of the CDA, because the suit impermissibly seeks to treat 
. . . , ( ( 
AOL as the "publisher or speaker" of the messages. (Def. Mem. at 5-12Y) AOL demonstrated, 
in particular, that the plain terms of Section 230 (id. at 6-8), as well as its legislative history and 
overarching policy goals (id. at 9-12), all support AOL's construction ofthe statute. AOL 
further explained that Plaintiff could not evade the bar of Section 230 merely by labeling his suit 
as a claim of simple negligence rather than a claim of defamation or another similar tort. ad. at 
12-17.) Plaintiff's opposition brief fails to refute AOL's construction and application of Section 
230. 
Despite his weak rhetoric that AOL has turned Section 230 "on its head," (PI. Opp. at 2, 
10 n.6), Zeran does not contest the basic foundations of AOL's argument. Thus, he does not 
dispute two key elements that make Section 230 control this case, namely (a) that AOL is a 
"provider of an interactive computer service" within the meaning of Section 230(c)(I) (see Def. 
Mem. at 7), and (b) that the messages over which Plaintiff has sued were "provided by another 
information content provider" as defined in Section 230(e)(3). (See id.) Moreover, he concedes 
both that Section 230 provides a "'safe harbor' for cyberspace distributors" (PI. Opp. at 10) and 
that Section 230 bars any civil cause of action against a distributor if the imposition of liability 
in that action would treat the distributor as the publisher or speaker of a message posted by a 
third party. @) 
Zeran's view of the operation of Section 230 diverges from that of AOL in only one 
respect: whether his suit to hold AOL liable for allegedly failing to remove or block messages 
11 In this Reply Memorandum, we cite AOL's "Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings" as "Def. Mem." and Plaintiff's "Brief in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings" as "PI. Opp." 
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posted on its service by a third person "treat[ s] [AOL] as the publisher" of those messages. AOL 
demonstrated in its opening brief that holding AOL liable for the harm those third-party 
messages allegedly caused to Zeran would treat AOL as the publisher of the messages from at 
least three critical perspectives: 
• Holding AOL liable for the damages allegedly caused to Plaintiff by these 
allegedly "defamatory and bogus" messages would put AOL in precisely the same 
legal position as the person who posted -- and therefore published -- the 
messages, thereby ''treat[ing] [AOL] as the publisher" of those messages. (Def. 
Mem. at 8.) 
• Under well-settled common law principles, liability for harm flowing from the 
dissemination of a defamatory statement may be imposed only upon a party who 
is deemed to have "published" the statement. As a result, Plaintiff's suit 
necessarily seeks to treat AOL as the publisher of the messages at issue. ad. at 
12-17.) 
• Plaintiff's suit seeks to impose on AOL a standard of care requiring it to review 
and edit the content of information appearing on its system and to issue 
retractions for information deemed to be erroneous.Y These are the quintessential 
Y At one point in his opposition, Zeran erroneously asserts that the standard of 
care that he seeks to apply in this action would not treat AOL as a publisher because it "does not 
impose upon AOL any obligation to examine in advance any material posted on its computer 
bulletin board." (PI. Opp. at 8.) This is utterly inconsistent with the position that Zeran 
advances throughout the remainder of his opposition. From the outset of this case, and 
throughout his opposition, Zeran has argued that AOL, once put on notice of the first offending 
message, was obligated to review in advance every subsequent message sought to be posted on 
its system and to block any of them that repeated any similar offending content. (Complaint ~~ 
(continued ... ) 
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duties of a publisher, and to impose them on AOL would obviously treat it as the 
"publisher" of the information posted on its system by third parties. ad. at 8.) 
A. Distributors Cannot Be Liable for Harms Caused by Third Party Content 
Without Beine Deemed Publishers of that Content. 
Rather than confronting the foregoing arguments and the plain meaning of 
Section 230, Zeran bases his opposition to AOL's motion principally on Cubby, Inc. v. 
Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), a case decided by a district court in New 
York several years before enactment of Section 230. Zeran erroneously argues that Cubby ruled 
that an interactive computer service provider may be liable for harm caused by defamatory 
infOrmation that a third party transmits over its service without treating the provider as the 
publisher ofthe information. (PI. Opp. at 8, 11, 15-16.) He builds this argwnent upon the 
demonstrably false premise that Cubby recognized a special cause of action -- wholly distinct 
from defamation or other causes of action applicable to those who "publish" false information --
for "negligent distribution" of defamatory information. QQ.) Zeran's interpretation of Cubby is 
totally wrong. 
Cubby did not even discuss, much less recognize, any cause of action that would 
subject an interactive computer service to liability for defamatory information transmitted by a 
third party without treating it as the publisher Qr speaker of that information. Instead, Cubby 
Y ( ... continued) 
43-45 (AOL "was obligated after due notice to be able to screen incendiary, defamatory andlor 
bogus material"); PI. Opp. at 7, 12, 13 (AOL "must implement some screening or editing 
function" (emphasis added»). 
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recognized that interactive computer services, as mere distributors of information being 
transmitted by third parties, enjoy as a matter of constitutional law a special level of protection 
that requires an exceptional threshold showing before they can be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of such information. Specifically, Cubby held that the First Amendment provides a 
"deeply rooted" protection for distributors such as interactive service providers and that, as a 
result, such a provider could be held liable as the publisher or speaker of defamatory matter 
posted by a third party only upon a showing that it knew or should have known of the 
defamation. 776 F. Supp. at 139-41. Zeran's attempt to transform this special level of protection 
into a new-found tort action of "negligent distributipn" in which liability may be imposed on an 
interactive computer service without treating it as a "publisher" is preposterous. 
The plaintiff in Cubby sought to hold Compuserve liable under three different tort 
theories, each of which plainly would have treated Compuserve as the publisher or speaker of 
allegedly defamatory information posted by a third party. Cubby's primary claim was for 
defamation, a tort whose most basic element is the requirement that the defendant have 
"published" the information in question. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 558 (1977). In 
discussing this claim, the Cubby court framed the issue as being whether there was a factual 
basis for treating Compuserve as though it had "originally published" defamatory messages 
posted by a third party. 776 F. Supp. at 139 (citation omitted, emphasis added). Similarly, in 
considering the two other tort claims presented in Cubby -- business disparagement and unfair 
competition -- the Court said that no liability could be imposed absent a showing that 
Compuserve had made a "knowing publication of false matter," and that Compuserve had 
"intentionally uttered" an injurious falsehood. rd. at 141, 142 (emphasis added). 
-5-
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Because holding Compuserve liable under each of the claims presented in Cubby 
would by definition have treated Compuserve as a publisher of third-party content, Cubby cannot 
possibly be interpreted as having invented a cause of action against interactive computer service 
providers that would subject them to liability for third-party content without treating them as the 
publishers of such content. Rather, as set out in AOL's opening brief (Def. Mem. at 15-16), 
Cubby is representative of a more general common law rule under which a distributor cannot be 
liable for harm caused by dissemination of third-party information in the absence of facts 
establishing that it was a publisher of that informationY Accordingly, Cubby, lends absolutely 
no support to, but instead highlights the fatal flaws in, Zeran's claim that his suit does not seek to 
treat AOL as the "publisher or speaker" of the messages at issue in this caseY 
'2.1 Zeran's opposition completely ignores the cases cited by AOL on this point, yet at 
the same time asserts that his unfoUnded interpretation of Cubby "is consistent with the law in 
every jurisdiction in the United States." (PI. Opp. at 12.) Astonishingly, Zeran's sole support 
for this breathtaking assertion is the ipse dixit of his own lawyer. (See id. ; Kayser Aff. 'j[5.) 
~ Zeran also errs in arguing that AOL's interpretation of Section 230 is somehow 
inconsistent with a brief filed by AOL's predecessor counsel before this case was transferred to 
. this Court. The only supposed inconsistency to which Plaintiff points -- that the brief supporting 
AOL's now-withdrawn motion to dismiss "acknowledged" that Section 23 O( c) "confirm[ ed] the 
law enunciated in Cubby" (PI. Opp. at 10) -- is in fact consistent with AOL's position here. 
AOL simply observed in that earlier brief that Section 230 "supports the decision in Cubby .... 
It will, henceforth, protect services such as AOL from being treated as the publisher of 
information posted on the net by others." (PI. Opp., Ex. A, at 17-18). This statement is fully 
consistent with AOL's present position that Section 230, like the Cubby decision itself, extends 
special protections to interactive computer services. In any event, even if this Court finds that 
there is any inconsistency, nothing bars AOL from refining its legal theory during the progress of 
this case. See -Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. v. William T. Burnett & Co., 691 F.2d 658, 664 (4th 
Cir. 1983) 
-6-
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Much of the remainder of Zeran's argument revolves around his contention that 
his suit does not seek to treat AOL as the "publisher or speaker" of the allegedly defamatory 
messages because his suit is not for defamation -- which ~e apparently concedes would be barred 
by Section 230 -- but for simple negligence, which he contends is unaffected by Section 230. 
Zeran's argument on this point goes immediately off track when he asserts, without citation to 
any authority, that Section 230 was designed to immunize interactive computer services from the 
"strict liability" to which publishers are held in defamation cases but to leave them unprotected 
from negligence suits. (PI. Opp. at 10-11.) This construction of Section 230 is plainly wrong 
because defamation itself is not a "strict liability" tort. To be held liable for defamation, a party 
must have published allegedly defamatory information with a level of fault am~unting to at least 
negligence. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 558, 580A, 580B; see also Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47 (1974) (First Amendment generally requires showing offault 
before defendant can be liable for defamation). It is therefore absurd to contend, as Plaintiff 
does, that Congress enacted Section 230 to "protect" interactive computer services by shielding 
them from "strict liability" but not "negligence liability." 
More fundamentally, Plaintiff is wrong in asserting that his suit against AOL for 
negligently failing to screen or remove defamatory information from its system is meaningfully 
distinguishable from a defamation suit for publishing defamatory information. (Def. Opp. at 7.) 
AOL"s opening brief has already established that if Section 230's applicability were to turn on 
such superficial differences as how the claim is labeled, then it would provide no protection 
whatsoever for interactive computer services. (Def. Mem. at 13.) Far from rebutting this point, 
Zeran's brief simply confirms that his claim is, in substance, a claim for defamation. Thus, he 
-7-
(" ( 
repeatedly asserts that the "operative facts" and "basic allegations" in his suit against AOL are 
"identical" to those of his defamation action against the owner of the radio station that broadcast 
one ofthe messages at issue here. (pl. Opp. at 18 n.7, 29.) 
Ultimately, Zeran's strained efforts to draw a distinction between his suit and a 
suit for defamation, and to characterize his suit as one that does not seek to treat AOL as a 
publisher of the allegedly defamatory messages, collapse of their own weight. Thus, by the end 
of his discussion of how Section 230 operates, he concedes that his theory of liability would (1) 
result in AOL being "deemed to have 'published'" the allegedly defamatory material (pl. Opp. at 
16); (2) subject AOL "to liability for '[the messages'] continued pUblication'" (id.); and (3) treat 
AOL as a "secondary publisher," a category that Zeran suggests, without authority, is "entirely 
distinct" from (rather than a subset of) the category of "publisher." ad. at 17.) AOL submits 
that these three concessions -- which Zeran remarkably makes in the course of accusing AOL of 
"sophistry" -- are each sufficient to establish that Zeran's suit seeks impermissibly to "treat 
[AOL] as the publisher or speaker" of the messages at issue. 
B. AOL's Interpretation of Section 230 Is In Harmony With the Purposes of 
That Section. 
Zeran further errs in arguing that AOL's interpretation of Section 230's 
"publisher or speaker" provision is inconsistent with Congress's intent, reflected in Section 
230(c)(2), to remove disincentives for interactive computer services to screen out potentially 
harmful material posted by third persons. (See Pl. Opp. at 9-11.) AOL agrees that Congress 
intended to remove legal disincentives to such voluntary "Good Samaritan" actions. At the same 
-8-
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time, Congress plainly did not require that interactive computer services engage in reviewing and 
screening, a fact reflected in both its express prohibition on treating them as "publishers" and its 
unambiguous declaration that their development be "unfettered by Federal or State regulation." 
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)Y Under Plaintiff's theory, however, AOL would in fact be required, as 
soon as it received some form of notice that a particular message was "bogus" or "defamatory," 
to review for an indefinite period every subsequent message posted anywhere on its entire 
system and to block any of them that could possibly be similar to the original offending message. 
The policy implications of Plaintiff's proposed rule that interactive service 
providers must engage in screening once they know or have reason to know that "libelous, 
defamatory or bogus material" has been posted on their systems are far-reaching and plainly 
cor;ttrary to Congress's intent. Plaintiff's proposed rule would actually have the perverse effect 
of discouraging the very sort of Good Samaritan actions that Congress intended to promote. 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). If a provider knew it would incur editorial duties and become subject to 
potential liability once it might have reason to know that a particular posting might be offensive, 
the provider would have a strong incentive to keep itself ignorant of what is on its system. Thus, 
a provider that knew it would not be liable for a third party's content might monitor its bulletin 
boards and eliminate content that it perceived to be harmful as a Good Samaritan action. But 
21 Plaintiff's suggestion that the government regulation with which Congress was 
concerned did not include state tort law (PI. Opp. at 13) is demonstrably false. Even he concedes 
that one of the purposes of Section 230 was to overrule Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy 
Service Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (PI. Opp. at 10), a case that was 
decided on the basis of New York common law. In any event, Section 230(d)(3) prohibits any 
action brought under "any [inconsistent] State or local law," which clearly includes state 
common law. . 
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that provider would be significantly less likely to engage in such monitoring under Plaintiff's 
proposed rule: by monitoring its boards, the provider would have reason to know about offensive 
posts and therefore incur legal duties and potential liability it would undoubtedly rather avoid. 
In proposing a rule that would discourage Good Samaritan actions, it is Plaintiff, not AOL, who 
is attempting to "tum[] the CDA on its head." PI. Opp. at 2. 
Plaintiff finally asserts that, under AOL's interpretation of Section 230, he would 
have no remedy for his alleged damage. As he puts it, "Congress surely did not leave Zeran 
alone to chase" the prankster who posted these messages. (PI. Opp. at 13.) As AOL pointed out 
in its opening memorandum, however, Congress did not "leave Zeran alone." Rather, it 
~xpressly sought "to ensure vigorous enfor.cement of Federal crirninallaws to deter and punish" 
the type of conduct engaged in by the person who posted the messages in this case. 47 U.S.C. § 
230(b)(5). Indeed, Plaintiff's own Complaint demonstrates that he was far from "alone" in 
chasing the prankster in this case -- the Secret Service, the FBI, and the local police were all 
involved. (Complaint ~~ 16, 27,29-31, 34). No legal regime can ever guarantee that every 
victim of wrongful conduct will be able to find the wrongdoer and recover his alleged damages. 
But that fact cannot justify treating AOL as the publisher of third party content in direct 
contravention of Section 230. 
II. SECTION 230 REQUIRES DISMISSAL OF TIDS CASE EVEN THOUGH THE 
EVENTS AT ISSUE OCCURRED BEFORE IT WAS ENACTED. 
As AOL established in its opening memorandum, although the CDA was enacted 
after the events described in Plaintiff's complaint allegedly occurred, Section 230 controls this 
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case. First, the text of Section 230 reveals that Congress expressly prescribed that the section 
applies to suits involving antecedent events. (Def. Mem. at 18-19.) Second, even if Section 230 
contained no such express prescription, application of the statute to antecedent events will not 
have a "retroactive effect" under any of the three tests set out in Landgraf v. US! Film Prods., 
511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505 (1994). (Def. Mem. at 19-21.) Accordingly, following 
Landgraf, this Court must apply the law in effect at the time of its decision -- namely, Section 
230 -- and dismiss Plaintiff's suit. 
Zeran acknowledges that Landgraf provides the framework for analyzing whether 
Section 230 controls this case. (PI. Opp. at 18 -19.) He further concedes that Congress may 
expressly prescribe that a statute apply to antecedent events and that, even in the absence of such 
a prescription, a statute will apply to a suit involving events pre-dating its enactment unless the 
statute has a "retroactive effect" as defined in Landgraf. Qd. at 19, 21.) Zeran argues, however, 
that Congress did not provide the requisite express prescription (ill. at 19-21) and that Section 
230 does have a retroactive effect. ilih at 21-29.) He is wrong on both counts. 
A. Congress Expressly Prescribed that Section 230 Applies to Events Pre-Dating 
Its Enactment. 
The plain text of Section 230 discloses Congress's intent that the statute govern 
any suit pending or filed after enactment of the statute. Section 230 prescribes that "[n]o cause 
of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State of local law that is 
inconsistent with this section." 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(3). This language could hardly be clearer: 
from the date of the CDA's enactment (February 8, 1996), no action may be filed and no liability 
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may be imposed under any state or local law inconsistent with Section 230.~1 Indeed, the plain 
meaning of the phrase "no liability may be imposed" is that Congress barred liability from being 
imposed even in suits that were pending when Section 230 was enacted. Therefore, f! fortiori, 
Section 230 must also be read as controlling all new lawsuits filed after its enactment. 
As AOL established in its opening brief, acceptance of Plaintiff's argument that 
Section 230 forbids only suits involving post-enactment events would not only defy the plain 
meaning of Section 230(d)(3), but would also violate the canon that a statute should not be 
interpreted in a manner that renders part of its language superfluous. Specifically, AOL showed 
that unless Section 230 is interpreted to apply to suits that were pending when the statute was 
enacted (suits that necessarily would have involved pre-enactment events), the clause "no 
liability may be imposed" would be superfluous. (See Def. Mem. at 18-19.) 
Rather than attempting to confront this argument and offer an alternative 
interpretation 'Of Section 230(d)(3), Zeran erroneously contends that Landgraf "rejected the 
argument that retroactivity was required to avoid making some language in the [Civil Rights] 
Act superfluous" and that AOL's argument is somehow "comparable." (PI. Opp. at 20.) This 
simply begs the question. To be sure, Landgraf did reject an argument that failing to apply the 
Civil Rights Act to antecedent events would render a portion of that Act superfluous, because it 
found the language at issue would still have a purpose even if that Act was applied only 
§! AOL does not, as Zeran erroneously suggests, argue that "by adopting an 
effective date ... Congress intended that the CDA should be applied retroactively." (PI. Opp. at 
20.) In fact, Section 230 does not even have an explicit effective date and therefore simply went 
into effect on the date of its enactment. See Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 1997 WL 
20401, No. 96-3489, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 1997). 
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prospectively. See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1493. But the Landgraf Court did not reach this 
conclusion by abandoning the canon that statutes should be read so as to give effect to all 
provisions. Indeed, the very fact that the Court went through a lengthy analysis of the Civil 
Rights Act to determine whether purely prospective application would render statutory language 
superfluous demonstrates just the opposite -- the Court believed that an analysis of particular 
statutory language in light of this canon can help determine if Congress has expressly prescribed 
that a statute should apply to antecedent events. 
B. Section 230 Does Not Have "Retroactive Effect." 
Even if this Court were to conclude (contrary to the foregoing analysis) that 
Congress did not expressly provide that Section 230 applies to events pre-dating its enactment, 
the statute would still control this case because it does not have a "retroactive effect.,,11 (See Def. 
Mem. at 19-21.) Zeran disputes this conclusion on the ground that the law embodies a 
"presumption against retroactive legislation" and that considerations of fairness preclude such 
retroactive application in this case. (PI. Opp. at 21-29.) Zeran's analysis is incorrect. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion that "the Landgraf court start[ed] with the general 
proposition that 'the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our 
11 Under Landgraf, "'retroactive effect' is a term of legal art, which does not 
describe all applications of a statute to preexisting causes of action or pending proceedings. The 
definition of 'retroactive effect' in this context is more narrow than that. ... " Hunter v. United 
States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1570 (11th Cir. 1996). Thus, the fact that a statute applies retrospectively 
-- to events occurring before enactment of the statute -- does not necessarily mean it has a 
"retroactive effect." 
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jurisprudence'" (PI. Opp. at 21), the Court actually sought to reconcile two longstanding 
principles that had appeared to be in some tension. As it explained, "[a]lthough we have long 
embraced a presumption against statutory retroactivity, for just as long we have recognized that, 
in many situations, a court should 'apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision,' 
even though that law was enacted after the events that gave rise to the suit." Landgr~ 114 
S. Ct. at 1501 (citation omitted). The Court observed that the "familiar considerations affair 
notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance" in attempting to 
resolve any tension between these principles. Id. at 1499. After surveying how past cases had 
applied these considerations when analyzing whether a statute should be applied to antecedent 
events, the Supreme Court concluded that a court should apply the law in effect at the time of 
decision -- even in cases involving events pre-dating the enactment of a statute -- if doing so . 
does not have "retroactive effect." The Court further held that application of a statute to pre.,. 
enactment events does not have "retroactive effect" unless it would "impair rights a party 
possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed." Id. at 1505. 
Rather than deal with this three-prong test, Zeran initially asserts that "[s]ince 
Landgraf was decided, the courts have uniformly declined to give retroactive effect to federal 
statutes." (PI. Opp. at 22.) This claim is patently untrue. In fact, in one of the cases Plaintiff 
himself cites as an example of a court declining to apply a statute to antecedent events, the court 
actually concluded that such application was appropriate under Landgraf. See Lindh v. Mw:phy, 
96 F.3d 856, 863-67 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted in part, 117 S. Ct. 726 (1997). Moreover, this 
Court itself relied on Landgraf to conclude that a statute concerning the revival of expired 
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patents should apply in a case involving events pre-dating the enactment of the statute. See 
Centigram Communications Com. v. Lehman, 862 F. Supp. 113 , 118-19 (E.D. Va. 1994) (Ellis, 
J.), appeal di.smissedper agmt. of the parties, 47 F.3d 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Kolster v. 
INS, 101 F.3d 785, 788-90 (lstCir. 1996)(statutorypreclusion of judicial review could b e 
applied under Landgraf in ~ase involving pre-enactment events); Forest v. U.S. Postal Service, 
97 F.3d 137, 140 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying statute of limitations to case involving conduct pre-
dating enactment of statute). 
Plaintiff next cites a laundry list of cases discussing retroactivity in the' context of 
statutes other than the CDA. (PI. Opp. at 22-25 .) Plaintiff merely summarizes the holdings of 
the cases and generally fails to explain the relevance of any of them to the analysis of Section 
230. An examination of these cases demonstrates that they offer Plaintiff no help. For example, 
while the court in Preston v. Com. of Va. ex reI. New River Community College, 31 F.3d 203 
(4th Cir. 1994), did decline to apply a particular section ofthe Civil Rights Act to antecedent 
events, it did so on the ground that such application would unfairly increase the liability of the 
defendant employer. See id. at 208. Clearly, Section 230 increases no party's liability. 
Plaintiff's citation to United States v. Bacon, 82 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 1996), is similarly unhelpful. 
Although the court in that case refused to apply a statute extinguishing fraudulent conveyance 
claims based on antecedent events, the claims at issue were intended to protect ~ creditor's 
vested contractual or property rights. See id. at 824. As discussed below, Section 230 does not 
impair any comparable vested right. Plaintiff's other citations are similarly inapposite.Y 
One case Plaintiff cites was reversed on the ground that the case did not even 
(continued ... ) 
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Plaintiff next pays lip service to the three-prong test established in Landgraf. (See 
PI. Opp. at 25-27). He fails, however, to show how application of Section 230 in a case 
involving pre-enactment events would have a "retroactive effect" under any of those three 
prongs. The first two prongs of this test clearly do not apply in this case -- Section 230 neither 
"increase[s] a party's liability for past conduct" nor "imposes new duties" on anyone. Plaintiff 
complains that these prongs of the test generally operate to favor defendants seeking to avoid 
liability rather than plaintiffs seeking to impose liability. (See PI. Opp. at 27). Far from being 
untoward or unfair, however, this differential impact follows inevitably from the very 
considerations of fair notice and reasonable reliance that Zeran invokes. Retroactivity law has 
l~ng endorsed such differeJ1ti(i1 treatment: 
The presumption against statutory retroactivity has consistently 
been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing new 
burdens on persons after the fact. Indeed, at common law a 
contrary rule applied to statutes that merely removed a burden on 
private rights by repealing a penal provision (whether criminal or 
civil); such repeals were understood to preclude punishment for 
acts antedating the repeal. 
'# ( ... continued) 
raise a retroactivity issue. See Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission v. 
O'Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 113 (3rd Cir. 1996). Another case involved a situation in which an 
attorney had a vested right in fees for services already performed. See Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 
914, 921 (7th Cir. 1996). The remaining cases on which Plaintiff relies dealt with statutes that 
increased a defendant's liability, a situation that clearly does not apply to this case. See Burris v. 
Parke, 95 F.3d 465,468 (7th Cir. 1996); Boria v. Keane, 90 F.3d 36,37-38 (2nd Cir. 1996); 
McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1240-41 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. $814.254.76. in 
U.S. Currency, 51 F.3d 207,209-11 (9th Cir. 1995); Travenol Laboratories. Inc. v. United States, 
936 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996); Bohrman v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 
926 F. Supp. 211 (D. Me. 1996). 
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Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1500. The reason for this difference is clear -- unlike a defendant, a 
prospective plaintiff generally does not reasonably rely on the absence or existence of a 
particular cause of action except to the extent that the plaintiff plans and files a lawsuit. Indeed, 
Zeran points primarily to just this type of conduct as evidence of his supposed "reliance." (PI. 
Opp. at 28-29.) He does not allege (and cannot show) that any action he took other than 
preparing to sue AOL was in any sense dependent on an expectation of a valid claim against 
AOL. But as Zeran himself observes elsewhere in his opposition, new rules that affect only "the 
plaintiff's conduct in filing the claim" do not have a retroactive effect. (PI. Opp. at 26.),1.1 
When Zeran finally reaches the only prong of the Landgraf analysis that even 
arguably might apply to Section 230 -- namely the test of whether application of a statute to pre-
enactment events would "impair rights a party possessed when he acted" -- he completely misses 
the mark. AOL demonstrated in its opening memorandum both (a) that this prong of the test for a 
retroactive effect may be met only if the statute impairs a "vested right" (Def. Mem. at 19-20); 
and (b) that the elimination of a potential or even pending tort claim does not impair a vested 
right. ad. at 20.) 
2/ Zeran points to three cases in which courts declined to apply a statute to 
antecedent events where such application would have eliminated a claim that otherwise could 
have been brought. (PI. Opp. at 28 n. 16.) In one of these, United States v. Bacon, the statute 
would have impaired the plaintiff's vested rights, a condition that is inapplicable here. See supra 
at 15. In the other two, Maitland v. University of Minnesota, 43 F.3d 357,361-63 (8th Cir. 
1994), and Rafferty v. City of Youngstown, 54 F.3d 278,281 n.l (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. 
Ct. 338 (1995), the plaintiff had expressly relied on the pre-existing law by participating in 
judicial proceedings under the assumption that such participation would not affect his right to 
bring a subsequent suit. Zeran has not, and cannot, shown any similar reliance in this case. 
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Zeran's principal response is to suggest -- without citation to any authority -- that 
even if a pending tort claim is not a vested right, "[i]t does not follow that a pending tort claim 
has no status in the Landgraf analysis which focuses on the fundamental fairness of 
retroactivity." (PI. Opp. at 26.) Even taken on its own terms, Zeran's argument fails. Zeran did 
not even have a pending tort claim at the time Section 230 was enacted. Moreover, Zeran simply 
could not reasonably rely on, or have settled expectations about, the existence of a common law 
"rule" that he purports to draw from dicta in a single district court decision applying the law of a 
jurisdiction that does not even govern this case. The absence of any unfairness to Zeran is 
further underscored by his concession that this is a case of first impression in which a jury will 
have to determine the appropriate standard of care for interactive service providers "for the first 
time." (PI. Opp. at 15.) 
In any event, as AOL established in its opening memorandum (Def. Mem. at 19-
20), the Landgraf Court concluded that under the third prong of its test, application of a statute to 
pre-enactment events is fair, and does not have retroactive effect, so long as it does not impair a 
vested right. Zeran cites no case holding that a pending tort claim (and the underlying common 
law rule on which it is based) are vested rights. The law is plainly to the contrary: "cases have 
clearly established that a person has ... no vested interest[] in any rule of common law." Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n. 32 (1978) (internal 
quotations omitted); New York Central RR. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917) ("No 
person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him to insist that it shall remain 
unchanged for his benefit."). "Because rights in tort do not vest until there is a final, 
unreviewable judgment, Congress abridge [s] no vested rights of plaintiff by ... retroactively 
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abolishing [plaintiff's] cause of action in tort." Hammond v. United States, 768 F.2d 8, 12 (1st 
Cir. 1986); see also In re TMI, 89 F.3d 1106, 1113 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, No. 96-730, 1996 
WL 665357 (Jan. 13, 1997) (statute that eliminates pending tort claim does not impair a vested 
right); Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. v. United States, 888 F. Supp. 543, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (statute that eliminated tort claim applied to pre-enactment events because such a claim is 
not a vested right until reduced to final judgment), aff'd, 75 F.3d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 
S. Ct. 51 (1996). 
In sum, applying Section 230 to this case would neither deprive Plaintiff of any 
vested right nor treat him unfairly in any other respect, and it therefore does not have retroactive 
effect. Accordingly, under the principles set out in Landgraf, Section 230 -- the law in effect at 
the time of decision -- controls this case.!Q1 
lQI Plaintiff attaches an assortment of documents to his opposition and erroneously 
asserts that they convert AOL's motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary 
judgment. (PI. Opp. at 2.) Plaintiff's attachments do not alter the nature of AOL's motion 
because they contain no facts outside of the pleadings that are at all germane to the issues raised 
by AOL's motion. Moreover, Plaintiff has utterly failed to comply with Local Rule 10(F)(2), 
under which a brief opposing a motion for summary judgment must include a "specifically 
captioned section listing all material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine 
issue necessary to be litigated." While AOL disputes the truth of many of the facts asserted by 
Plaintiff (including many of those in the attachments to his opposition), for purposes of this 
motion it treats all allegations in the Complaint as true. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as for the reasons set out in AOL's opening 
memorandum, AOL respectfully requests this Court to grant judgment on the pleadings in its 
favor and to dismiss Plaintiff s suit with prejudice. 
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